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I. The Perceived Gap Between Rules and Approaches
It is a natural consequence of economic interdependence and increased cross-
border claims that legal systems seek to provide local plaintiffs with a local
forum for the litigation of their claims against foreign defendants. Both U.S. and
European courts, therefore, assert far-reaching judicial jurisdiction.' This may
be an inconvenience for the foreign defendant, but represents the reasonable-
and probably not unexpected-price of doing business interstate or internation-
ally. The matter may be quite different, however, and fairness may indeed be
implicated, when the place of suit also means a change in, or is determinative of,
the applicable substantive law.
Classical conflicts law, represented in U.S. law by the first Restatement,2
provided fixed rules-some statutory in nature in Europe, decisional law in the
United States-so that the selection of the place of suit was indeed mainly for
reasons of trial convenience and not for a substantive law advantage.
*A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; L.Q.C. Lamar Professor of Law, Emory University; Alumni
Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus and former Dean, University of Illinois.
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1. There are differences concerning the respective reach of specific (claim-related) and general
jurisdiction. With respect to most matters relevant to the present survey-torts, including of course
products liability claims-the difference will generally be unimportant: local (specific) jurisdiction
exists because the injury arose locally; there is therefore no need to determine the existence of
general jurisdiction. For comparative discussion, see Peter Hay, Flexibility versus Predictability and
Uniformity in Choice of Law, 226 REcUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
(COLLECTED COURSES) 281, 311-33 (Hague Academy of International Law, 1991-I).
2. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). For brief comment and further references, see
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.5, 17.2-.7 (2d ed. 1992).
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Fixed rules were decried in the United States as mechanical and as insufficiently
suited to take account of particular party or societal interests, particularly those
of the forum. The ensuing conflicts revolution3 in the United States-the change
from fixed rules to approaches for the selection of the applicable law (for example,
interest analysis, identification of the place of the most significant relationship,
the search for the better rule of law) 4-was decried in Europe as too result-
selective. U.S. conflicts decisions seemed to be free-wheeling and ad hoc, and
often appeared to be inward looking, that is, to favor the application of local law.
Predictability (legal certainty) seemed to be a secondary goal.
European conflicts law subsequently also became more flexible. Statutory re-
form or new codifications focus on the law most closely connected with the
transaction5 rather than on mechanical connecting factors. At first glance, the
difference between contemporary European conflicts law and the U.S. approaches
appears to be that European law introduced flexibility into the choice-of-law
process while providing defined limits-through an a priori identification of the
value goals to be achieved-while U.S. decisional law continues to proceed ad
hoc, with flexibility unchecked and certainty impaired. In one state, New York,
a seminal decision (Neumeier)6 sought to extrapolate values and goals from prior
decisions and to cast them into the form of rules. Moreover, Louisiana codified
its conflicts law in 1991' and thereby also gave its courts direction in the use of
the new flexibility. The case law in other U.S. jurisdictions has not yet articulated
rules.
The basic issues involved in litigation (and the focus of the present inquiry is
on tort litigation) are more or less the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Rules
(with exceptions for the sake of flexibility) can be articulated in advance, as both
the Neumeier decision and the European statutory solutions demonstrate. When
rules have not been articulated, as is the case in most U.S. jurisdictions, questions
arise about the possibility of discerning decisional patterns that, in a manner
similar to articulated rules, give definition to, and provide limitations upon the
modern flexible choice-of-law process in the interest of predictability and cer-
tainty.
The survey that follows traces the success of the Neumeier rules in New York
and thereafter examines, and tests against the Neumeier rules, the case law in a
selected number of other American states. The purpose is to determine, however
tentatively and perhaps even intuitively, whether U.S. decisions display enough
of a pattern to permit the conclusion that the gap between European and U.S.
practice is no longer so great as often supposed and feared.
3. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers,
80 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1966).
4. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, §§ 2.6 et seq.
5. For discussion and further references, see Hay, supra note 1, at 311-33.
6. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
7. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3515 et seq. (West 1992).
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II. The Rules States: New York and Louisiana
A. NEW YORK AND THE NEUMEIER RULES
1. New York Choice of Law in Tort Before Neumeier
New York departed from territorially oriented rules for the choice of the appli-
cable law in tort in the well-known decision of Babcock v. Jackson.' In Babcock,
the New York court regarded the place of the accident as too fortuitous to justify
the application of its law to the question of a New York driver's immunity from
liability to his New York host. Babcock was factually a simple case, and the rule
that it furnished therefore proved inadequate for cases of greater complexity.
Ensuing New York decisions attempted to fit different fact patterns into the general
"center of gravity" idea, providing lower courts and the bar with little or no
guidance.9 When Tooker v. Lopez ° reached the New York Court of Appeals in
1969, the court was ready to abandon contact counting, analysis of the center of
gravity of the host/guest relationship, and the like. The Tooker court embraced
interest analysis,n holding that New York had an interest in affording recovery
to a New York domiciliary killed elsewhere as the result of the alleged negligence
of another New Yorker. The concurring judges were troubled by the uncertainty
that inheres in such an open-ended approach. For instance, what should the
applicable law be if the non-New York third party, also injured in the Tooker
accident, were to sue the driver? The chance to limit the open-endedness came
with Neumeier.
2. The Neumeier Rules
The facts of Neumeier v. Kuehner" were simple. Kuehner, a resident of Buf-
falo, New York, drove his car to Ontario, Canada, to pick up his friend Neumeier
who lived there. They planned a day's trip to another part of Ontario where,
apparently, they were to prepare cottages Kuehner owned for the coming rental
season.1 3 On the way, both were killed when a train hit their car as it crossed
railroad tracks in Ontario. Neumeier's wife brought a wrongful death action
against Kuehner's estate and the railroad company. At issue was the applicability
of the Ontario guest statute, which prevented guests in an automobile from bring-
ing negligence actions against their host drivers. New York did not have such a
statute.
8. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
9. For a review of New York case law, and further references, see ScoILs & HAY, supra note
2, §§ 17.26 et seq.
10. 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969).
11. Actually, Miller v. Miller, 237 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1968), had adopted the interest-analysis
choice-of-law model even earlier. However, it was an easier case than Tooker because no third party
interests were involved, to be considered or, as in Tooker, to be ignored.
12. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
13. See Harold L. Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772,
886 (1983).
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The court first distinguished its previous holding in Tooker v. Lopez. There,
both the guest passenger and host driver were New York domiciliaries, and it was
on that basis that New York law controlled. 14 The court noted that Tooker had
expressly left open the question whether New York law would apply in the present
situation stating:
What significantly and effectively differentiates the present case is the fact that, although
the host was a domiciliary of New York, the guest, for whose death recover is sought,
was domiciled in Ontario, the place of accident and the very jurisdiction which had
enacted the statute designed to protect the host from liability for ordinary negligence.
It is clear that although New York has a deep interest in protecting its own residents,
injured in a foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state, it has no
legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction-such as On-
tario-and in protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation
obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a vehicle traveling within
its borders. 15
This passage was the basis for the rules that were announced. Referring to his
own concurring opinion in Tooker, Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the majority
in Neumeier, declared that the time had come to "minimize what some have
characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case approach by laying down guidelines, as
well as we can, for the solution of guest-host conflicts problems. -16 The guidelines
took the form of three rules:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and
determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that
state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held
liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under
the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest
was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery,
the driver who has come into that state should not-in the absence of special
circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in
different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the appli-
cable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred
but not if it can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will
14. Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 455.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 457 (internal quotation omitted). In contemporary times, this criticism was echoed by
the English and Scottish Law Commissions when they proposed a return, by statute, to the place-of-tort
rule as against adherence to the "proper law" as the principal choice-of-law rule in tort: "the proper
law of the tort has been criticized for the uncertainty which has obtained in certain United States
jurisdictions .... [I]t is unacceptable as a general rule .. " LAW COMMISSION AND SCOTTISH
LAW COMMISSION, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT AND DELICT 11 (Law
Comm'n. No. 193, Scot. Law Comm'n. No. 129, 1990).
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advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth
working of the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for liti-
gants. 
17
Neumeier itself presented a rule 3 situation. The court applied the law of the place
of injury; it did not utilize the proviso of the second sentence because displacing
the otherwise applicable law would not advance the substantive law purposes of
New York without impairing the smooth workings of the multistate system.1"
In some ways the Neumeier rules resemble both interest analysis and the Re-
statement (Second). The rules can be seen as a "particularization of Restatement
(Second) principles. . . establishing priorities of the kind the Restatement's draft-
ers were unwilling to do. "'9 The rules are also similar to interest analysis-New
York's methodological orientation by the time Tooker was decided2 -in that
they weigh interests. They do so, however, in advance of the actual case, thus
facilitating predictable results while retaining the flexibility that a weighing of
interests can give. 2 And while the interests weighed in advance were not specifi-
cally delineated in the Neumeier opinion, they can be easily ascertained.
The Neumeier rules date to the recognition in Babcock v. Jackson21 , that me-
chanical application of the lex loci rule can produce unsatisfactory results. Both
parties in Babcock shared New York as their domicile. The fact that the accident
occurred in another state was "purely adventitious." 2 2 Thus, out of Babcock,
Neumeier rule 1 was created, calling for the application of the law of the parties'
common domicile in order to protect them from the "unfair or anachronistic"
laws of another state.23 But the purpose of Neumeier rule 1 goes beyond this. It
is designed to protect the expectations of the parties, to the extent that expectations
exist in tort. Furthermore, as the court of appeals subsequently recognized in Boy
Scouts of America, Inc. v. Schultz,24 application of the law of the parties' common
domicile serves to reduce forum shopping, rebuts charges that the forum-locus
decides in favor of its own laws or laws favoring recovery, and, perhaps most
important, it "brings a modicum of predictability and certainty to an area of law
needing both.' 25
17. Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58. The Neumeier rules drew much comment, most of it
critical. See, e.g., Symposium, Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 94
(1973); Robert A. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in
Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975 (1977); see also Korn, supra note 13.
18. Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458.
19. Hay, supra note 1, at 386.
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. Hay, supra note 1, at 386-94.
21a. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963).
22. Id. at 284.
23. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456 (N.Y. 1972).
24. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985); infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
25. Hay, supra note 1, at 366-67 (describing common domicile rule in Germany); SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 2, § 17.26, at 613 n. 13 (describing common domicile rule for Swiss, French, and
English law); Symeon C. Symeonides, Problems and Dilemmas in Codifying Choice of Law for Torts:
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Neumeier rule 2 is an offshoot of rule 1. It also protects party expectations by
guarding against an unfair result in situations where the place of injury is fortu-
itous.26 The first sentence of Neumeier rule 2 applies the law of the defendant's
domicile when the tort occurred there and that state's law would not hold the
defendant liable. This rule has two discernable purposes. It discourages forum
shopping by consistently applying the law of the place of the defendant's conduct
(when that law is more favorable to the defendant), no matter where the plaintiff's
domicile is or where the plaintiff brings suit. The rule also protects party expecta-
tions in the sense that it gives defendants the ability to predict the consequence
of their actions within their home state and plan their conduct accordingly. 7
Rule 2, second sentence, also protects party expectations; this time the plain-
tiffs. In a rule 2, second sentence, fact pattern, application of the plaintiff's
protective home state law will further that state's interest. At the same time, the
defendant's home state will not have been disfavored, presumably because it does
not have an interest in the application of its protective law to actions that occur
outside its borders.
Finally, Neumeier rule 3 embodies what remains of the traditional lex loci
approach; it is the default rule, which applies when party expectations or the
protection of domiciliaries from "unfair or anachronistic" laws of a foreign state
are not a concern. That facts of Neumeier itself fell into the rule 3 category: A
Canadian domiciliary died in an accident in Canada as the result of the alleged
negligence of a New York resident. The court applied Canada's guest statute,
holding that:
It is clear that although New York has a deep interest in protecting its own residents,
injured in a foreign state, against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that state, it has no
The Louisiana Experience in Comparative Perspective, 38 AM. J. COMp. L. 431, 450 n.68 (1990)
listing other countries, including Austria, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and the former East Germany,
that have adopted some form of common domicile rule.
26. The Neumeier rule 2 choices select one law, using party expectations as a starting point. So
does the English proposal, starting from a somewhat different basis. See supra note 16. However,
choice-of-law in tort could also emphasize plaintiff-interests. The German "Ubiquitats" rule, for
instance, selects the law of the place of conduct or injury on the basis of which is more favorable
to the plaintiff. This rule favors the plaintiff substantively; it does not necessarily favor the lex fori.
Critics note that such alternative references are not available to the plaintiff in a domestic tort case.
See Hay, supra note 1, at 366. With respect to American law, it has recently been argued that
"choice-of-law methods that prefer local litigants, local law, or better law are unconstitutional."
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 336 (1992). For American plaintiff-favoring decisions (in
cases in which courts count contacts and weigh individual interests), see infra notes 45 (with respect to
conduct regulating and loss allocating rules), 50-54. When combined with rules ofjudicial jurisdiction
permitting suit in several fora (which is true, for practical purposes, both in Europe and the United
States, see Hay, supra note 1, at 306-09), built-in alternative references or unprincipled approaches
for the determination of the applicable law facilitate forum shopping.
27. See Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (purpose
behind Neumeier rule 2, first sentence, is to protect "the reasonable ... expectations of [defendant]
within its borders from the severe uncertainty of financial liability arising out of suits [outside the
defendant's domicile]").
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legitimate interest in ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction-such as On-
tario-and in protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation
obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a vehicle traveling within
its borders.28
Neumeier rule 3's proviso gives it flexibility in situations where displacing the
lex loci will advance relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the
smooth workings of the interstate system. 29 However, in order to maintain the
rule's predictability, the rule 3 proviso should be used sparingly; resort to it should
serve the purpose of discouraging forum shopping or protecting any existing party
expectations.3°
By identifying the relevant values and interests in advance of an actual case,
the Neumeier rules (and perhaps most New York decisions whether or not they
follow the rules specifically) have created predictable results while avoiding, to
a large extent, the inflexible results to which the lex loci may lead. Choice-of-law
approaches, such as California's comparative impairment approach, and the Re-
statement (Second)'s "most significant relationship" test, may also contain a
priori value judgments. As approaches, rather than rules, however, they are
designed as tools for the decisions of individual cases and, absent a body of case
law with precedential force, may therefore provide far less predictability of result.
The sections that follow examine post-Neumeier choice-of-law decisions in
New York and survey the decisional law of selected states in order to explore
whether decisions based on approaches display a pattern giving them some of the
rules certainty of New York's Neumeier rules.
3. The New York Cases After Neumeier
Prior to the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc.
v. Schultz, New York courts did not apply the Neumeier rules consistently. Several
courts simply ignored them. Instead they applied interest analysis, 3' a center of
28. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456 (N.Y. 1972).
29. Id. at 458. Neumeier rule 2, second sentence, also provides a (somewhat unspecific) level
of flexibility in providing for the application of the law of the plaintiff's domicile "in the absence
of special circumstances." See supra text accompanying note 17. Neumeier rule 3, including its
proviso, resembles the choice-of-law rule now proposed for all situations by the English and Scottish
Law Commissions, see supra note 16, in that both lack the plaintiff-bias of the German rule, see supra
note 26. The strict formulation of the English proposal, however, may invite frequent recourse to the
proviso, i.e., displacement of the rule by an interest-weighing approach.
30. See infra note 47.
31. See, e.g., Beasock v. Dioguradi Enter., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Div. 1984). The court
applied the three-step interest analysis approach adopted in Tooker v. Lopez to a wrongful death claim
brought by the wife of a New York truck driver against an Ohio tire manufacturer, a Washington,
D.C., tire manufacturers' association, and an Ohio tire rim manufacturers' association after the truck
driver was killed at a New York gas station when the truck tire exploded as it was being inflated.
The court never resolved competing interests between the states, however, holding instead that a
postoccurrence change in New York law removed an interest New York had in the application of its
law. Id. at 801. Decisions in approach-oriented states also have applied this "postoccurrence change
in law" rationale as the basis for applying another state's law. See, e.g., Hill v. Hill, 238 Cal. Rptr.
745 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussed infra note 99).
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gravity or grouping of contacts approach drawn from such early New York cases
as Babcock,32 or a most significant contacts approach33 perhaps in acceptance of an
early view that the Neumeier rules applied only to guest statute cases.34
The New York Court of Appeals revisited the Neumeier rules in 1985, this time
in a case that did not involve a guest statute. In Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America,
Inc.35 the court removed any remaining uncertainty regarding the applicability of
the Neumeier rules to cases other than those involving a guest statute. It declared
that there was "no logical basis for distinguishing guest statutes from other
loss-distributing rules." 36 The court traced New York choice-of-law-decisions in
32. See, e.g., Nevader v. Deyo, 489 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App. Div. 1985); Blais v. Deyo, 461
N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 1983).
33. See, e.g., Croft v. Nat'l Car Rental, 439 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1982). The New York Court
of Appeals itself failed to apply its Neumeier rules in a case between British plaintiffs and a Minnesota
rental car company doing business in New York arising from an accident that occurred in Vermont
(Vermont's law did not provide recovery under vicarious liability but New York's did). In a one-page
opinion the court of appeals appeared to take a "most significant contacts" approach, never mentioning
the Neumeier rules. The court found only minimal New York contacts and therefore applied Vermont
law, finding no significant interests of New York in applying its law when neither the injured party,
the place of accident, nor the automobile had any connection with the state. Id. at 347. Perhaps the
court gave the case such cursory treatment because forum shopping seemed so obvious. Nonetheless,
it missed an opportunity to apply Neumeier rule 3 to a case involving a rule of law other than a guest
statute.
34. See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 730 F.2d 842, 848 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that lex
loci remains the general rule in New York tort law unless "extraordinary circumstances" displaced
that law); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973) (refusing
to adopt domicile-based approach in nonguest statute case, instead applying more general interest
analysis); Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (cautioning against unwarranted extension of the Neumeier rules). If so, that view would change
with Schultz. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
35. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). New Jersey parents sued two charitable organizations for
negligence in assigning a teacher to a New York day camp where the teacher sexually abused their
children. New Jersey, the domicile of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants (the other was domiciled
in Ohio) provided for charitable immunity that would have prevented the suit. New York, the place
of conduct, did not.
36. Id. at 686. Because the Neumeier rules were originally designed for guest statute cases,
Schultz's clarification that they apply to all tort cases may ultimately require a clarification of the
rules.
Because certain torts, such as those in product liability actions, may involve conduct in one state
that causes injury in another, a factual situation may arise where both rule 2, first sentence, and rule
2, second sentence, appear to be applicable. This might occur, for example, in a product liability
action in which the defective product is manufactured in the defendant's home state (and that state's
law favors the defendant) but caused injury in the plaintiff's home state (and that state's law favors
the plaintiff). In these situations perhaps the language of rule 2, second sentence, stating that the law
of the plaintiffs home state will apply "in the absence of special circumstances" implies that rule
2, first sentence, takes precedence. One recent federal court decision applying New York law, In re
DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), solved this problem by determining that the
locus of the tort in a group of New York DES product liability cases was the place where the "last
event" creating liability occurred. In that case, the court held that the "last event" was the ingestion
of the drug, which, for purposes of the New York action, the court assumed was in New York. Id.
For purposes of this survey, the broadest reading of Neumeier rule 2 will be used. Neumeier rule 2,
first sentence, applies when tortious conduct occurring in the defendant's home state caused injury
there or elsewhere and the law of the defendant's home state would not hold the defendant liable or
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tort from Babcock to Tooker to Neumeier. It derived from these early cases an
important, yet difficult, distinction between rules of law that regulate conduct and
those that allocate loss. Schultz observed that "the relative interests of the domicile
and locus jurisdictions in having their laws apply will depend on the particular
tort issue in conflict in the case. 37 If the conflicting rules address the appropriate
standards of conduct, for instance, "rules of the road," then the law of the place
of tort will have "a predominant, if not exclusive concern."38 If, on the other
hand, the rule's purpose is to allocate losses that result from tortious conduct, the
locus jurisdiction will have only a "minimal interest in determining the right of
recovery or the extent of the remedy in an action by a foreign domiciliary for
injuries resulting from the conduct of a codomiciliary. .... "'9
In the wake of Schultz, many New York courts accepted Neumeier and its rules
as the applicable choice-of-law method in all tort cases involving conflicting
postoccurrence loss allocation rules.4° Even when they failed to apply the rules
would be more favorable in some way than the laws of the other states at issue. Similarly, Neumeier
rule 2, second sentence, applies when injury in the plaintiff's home state was caused by conduct there
and the law of that state would hold the defendant liable or is in any way more favorable to the plaintiff
than the laws of the other states at issue. (Neumeier rules 1 and 3 require no clarification. Rule 1
applies whenever parties share a common domicile and rule 3 continues to apply as the default rule.)
Professor Weintraub has also proposed a rule to govern products liability cases. He would select
the law of the plaintiff's habitual residence if the harm was caused there or the products were there
available through commercial channels and their availability was foreseeable to the defendant. The
defendant could also elect that law. Also, failing that, the plaintiff, and thereafter the defendant, could
select the defendant's principal place of business, the place of acquisition or manufacture of or harm
caused by the product. Additional proposed rules would apply to the availability of punitive damages.
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 74-75 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1991). He also recommends that the rule previously proposed for all torts be modified to apply to
torts not involving enterprise liability, and he suggests that all enterprise liability torts be governed
by a rule similar to the one proposed for products liability. Id. at 75. See also Russell J. Weintraub,
Methods for Resolving Conflict of Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129.
It should be noted that Professor Weintraub's proposals, while far more differentiated than the
Neumeier rules or other current methods, do not encompass a general plaintiff bias, as does the
German rule. See supra note 26.
37. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 685. Loss allocating rules are seen as those that govern such issues as damage limitations,
vicarious liability, and immunity from suit. Id. In contrast, rules governing the availability of punitive
damages have been characterized as conduct regulating rules. See Symeonides, supra note 25, at 451.
40. See, e.g., Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (Neumeier
rule 2(a) applied to a claim arising from swimming pool accident at Mexican resort hotel involving
a New York plaintiff and a Mexican defendant, the owner of the hotel. Mexican law limited damages
to "moral damages" and would not allow damages for pain and suffering. New York had no such
damage limitation. The court characterized the damage limitation rules as loss-allocating and applied
Mexican law under Neumeier rule 2(a)). See also Whisenhut v. Sylvania Corp., 671 F. Supp. 214
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (rule 3); Murphy v. Acme Markets, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (rule
3); Stevens v. Shields, 499 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (rule 3); Weisberg v. Layne-New York
Co., 517 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (rule 3); Reale v. Herco, Inc., 589 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div.
1992) (rule 3). For recent surveys discussing New York decisions, see P. John Kozyris & Symeon
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. COMP. L.
601, 616-17 (1990); P. John Kozyris, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1987: An Overview,
36 AM. J. COMP. L. 547, 554-55 (1988) (discussing Whisenhut and other federal cases applying New
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directly (ostensibly invoking another choice-of-law approach), the courts often
employed reasoning similar to that underlying the Neumeier rules. Not surpris-
ingly, New York courts often applied this Neumeier-like reasoning in the context
of interest analysis.41
In Cain v. Boy Scouts of America,42 for example, the court applied interest
analysis in a case brought against a New York domiciliary by a New York boy
scout for injuries that occurred at a camp in New Jersey. While not expressly
applying Neumeier rule 1, the court's interest analysis focused on the parties'
common domicile and reached a result consistent with rule 1.43 More recently,
in DeRose v. New Jersey Transit Rail Oper.,44 a New York court applied
Neumeier-like reasoning in the context of interest analysis to a wrongful death
action brought by the father of a New York resident who was killed in New York
when struck by a train operated by a New Jersey municipal corporation.45
York choice-of-law principles). See also Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HASTINGs L.J. 1041, 1105-16 (1985) (discussing application of New York choice-of-law principles).
The courts, however, did not always succeed in applying the rules correctly. See, e.g., Bader v.
Purdom, 841 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (Neumeier rule 3 applied to Canadian dog bite accident involving
New York plaintiff and Canadian defendant where Canadian law allowed the dog owner to file a claim
for contribution against the parents of the injured child for their negligent supervision of the child
while New York's doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity did not; court incorrectly applied Neumeier
rule 3, but concurring opinion recognized that rule 2, first sentence, was applicable rule). See also
LaForge v. Normandin, 551 N.Y.S.2d 142 (App. Div. 1990) (Neumeier rule 3 incorrectly applied
to New York auto accident case involving a Canadian plaintiff and Canadian and New York defendants;
Neumeier rule 1 should have applied to the Canadian defendant).
41. Thomas v. Hanamer, 489 N.Y.S.2d 802 (App. Div. 1985), a case decided only a few months
after Schultz, was the only case surveyed that applied Neumeier-like reasoning in a context other than
interest analysis. Thomas involved a Canadian automobile accident between a New York plaintiff and
a New York defendant. At issue was a Canadian law that restricted recovery to economic loss. Id.
at 804. New York's law would allow recovery of damages for pain and suffering as well as economic
loss. The court applied a "grouping of contacts" approach and held that New York had the most
significant contacts because it was the place of domicile of the parties, the place where the car was
registered, and the place where both parties began their trips and intended to return. Id. at 805. Most
revealing is the court's focus on the parties' common domicile. Furthermore, the court held that this
case was similar to Schultz because it involved a loss allocation rule and parties with a common
domicile. Id. However, while the court recognized that the result reached was consistent with "the
unanimous line of decisions applying common-domicile rather than locus law in cases exhibiting the
basic Babcock v. Jackson affiliation pattern," it never explicitly applied Neumier rule 1. Id. at 806.
42. 519 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1987).
43. As in Schultz the issue in Cain was whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute applied.
The court characterized the charitable immunity statute as loss-allocating and held that New Jersey
had a minimal interest in having its law apply because neither party was a New Jersey domiciliary.
Id. at 44. New York, for its part, was said to have an important interest "in protecting the resident
plaintiffs, whose relationship with the defendant arose because of the latter's presence in this state."
Id. This reference to the protection of resident plaintiffs is consistent with Neumeier rule l's protective
purpose in situations where the occurrence of the accident in another state was "purely adventitious."
See Neumier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456 (N.Y. 1972). See also supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text (discussing purpose of Neumier rule 1).
44. 565 N.Y.S.2d 305 (App. Div. 1991).
45. New York law, for the most part, favored the plaintiff. On the basis of an implicit loss-
allocation characterization the court concluded that New York had a stronger interest in determining
the allocation of losses at issue than New Jersey, the defendant's home state, because the plaintiff
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While New York choice-of-law decisions after Schultz moved toward more
predictable results (either through the direct application of the rules or through
consistent Neumeier-like reasoning), some aspects of the rules and of the case law
may again reduce certainty. One area of uncertainty results from Neumeier rule
3's proviso that allows for the displacement of the law of the place of injury if
doing so "will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing
the smooth workings of the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for
litigants." 46 The proviso potentially provides an avenue for the disregard of the
was a New York resident, the tortious conduct and injury took place in New York and New York
had a "deep and abiding interest in protecting its resident injured as a result of a nonresident defendant's
presence in [the] state." Id. at 306. The DeRose court's focus on New York's interest is strikingly
similar to one of the purposes behind Neumeier rule 2, second sentence. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text (discussing Neumeier rule 2). For other New York decisions that also used interest
analysis and reached the same result as the Neumeier rules, see Crossland Sav. FSB v. Rockwood
Ins. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interest analysis consistent with Neumeier rule 3);
O'Donnell v. NPS Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1987) (interest analysis consistent with
Neumeier rule 1); Awes v. Cross, 575 N.Y.S.2d 991 (App. Div. 1991) (interest analysis consistent
with Neumeier rule 1); Coouey v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. Div. 1992) (interest
analysis consistent with Neumeier rule 3).
Some decisions, however, applied interest analysis and achieved results inconsistent with the
Neumeierrules. See Roach v. McGuire & Bennett, 539 N.Y.S.2d 138 (App. Div. 1989) (Pennsylvania
law barring recovery from a general contractor when worker received workman's compensation from
subcontractor applied in an action against a New York general contractor by a New York construction
worker for injury in Pennsylvania). Had the Neumeier rules been used in Roach, New York law would
have applied at least with respect to the New York defendant. The Roach court's failure to apply the
Neumeier rules was due to the presence of a Pennsylvania subcontractor who was the plaintiff's
employer. See also First Interstate Credit v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 433 (App. Div.
1989) (reversing lower court decision that applied interest analysis in a manner consistent with
Neumeier rule 2, first sentence). For a discussion of other recent New York decisions applying interest
analysis, see George B. Reese, Conflict of Laws, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 457. 483-86 (1991).
46. See Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458. In Stevens v. Shields, 499 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1986),
the court used the Neumeier rule 3 proviso to apply Florida law to a claim arising from a New York
accident between a New York plaintiff and a Florida defendant. Florida law would have called for
the application of vicarious liability principles to the minor defendant's parent because she signed the
defendant's driver's license application. New York would not hold the parent vicariously liable. The
court held that Florida had a significant interest in the application of its law to its domiciliaries, and
resort to Florida law would not harm New York's interest in protecting its residents from liability
because no New York defendant was involved in the case. Id. at 353. Florida law, the court concluded,
would also further the smooth workings of the multistate system because "[the parent's] only reason-
able expectation would have been that the law of her domicile would apply to her liability for her
son's negligent operation of a motor vehicle wherever he may drive .... " Id; see also Murphy v.
Acme Markets, 650 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff favoring New York law applied under
the proviso to claim brought by New York plaintiff injured in New Jersey, at job site owned by
Pennsylvania defendant, while working for New York employer; New York had interest in protecting
New York domiciliaries injured in foreign jurisdictions, while New Jersey had no interest in applying
its loss-allocation rules when no party was New Jersey domiciliary). For New York decisions declining
to apply the proviso where it may have been applicable, see Weisberg v. Layne-New York Co., 517
N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (in wrongful death case between New York plaintiff and New Jersey
defendants over a New Hampshire accident, the court applied New Hampshire law allowing for
greater recovery under Neumeier rule 3). See also Whisenhut v. Sylvania Corp., 671 F. Supp. 214
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (wrongful death action between Arkansas plaintiff and New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania defendants; New York's shorter statute of limitations applied to all defendants). In
both cases the court failed to consider party expectations before declining to apply the rule 3 proviso.
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basic rules and the use of a preferred (or better) rule of law, perhaps the lex fori.47
All rule-based approaches to choice of law do, of course, need an ultimate escape
(corrective) device, as the European experience in contracts choice-of-law unifi-
cation also teaches. 48 There, however, the tradition has been more rule-oriented.
The question, therefore, is to what extent U.S. courts can resist the temptation
to start the analysis with the broadly phrased exception rather than with the
narrowly drawn rule? The same question may arise in England if the proposal for
a statutory choice-of-law rule in tort should become law.49
Another area of uncertainty stems from the distinction the case law draws
between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules. Several New York cases
interpreting the same New York statute demonstrate the problem that inheres in
the distinction. In Calla v. Schulsky 50 a New York plaintiff was injured at a job
site in New Jersey when a ladder on which he was working fell. He sued the mall
owner and the store owner, both of whom were New York domiciliaries. A New
In Weisberg, if both New Jersey and New York law provided for less recovery, application of either
state's law would be more consistent with party expectations than application of the New Hampshire
law. Similarly, in Whisenhut after characterizing the statute of limitations as substantive (for a
discussion of limitations, see ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 2, at 59), the court did not examine whether
Pennsylvania and New Jersey had similar statutes of limitations as Arkansas. If they had, party
expectations might be better served by applying those states' longer statutes. In these situations, the
so-called "false common domicile" cases, application of a modified Neumeier rule 1, applying the
law common to the parties' different domiciles, would accomplish goals similar to Neumeier rule 1
and avoid problems with application of the rule 3 proviso. See Hay, supra note 1, at 387. Louisiana's
recent codification of its choice-of-law principles creates precisely this rule. See infra note 70.
47. New York courts do not have specific standards for the determination of whether the Neumeier
rule 3 proviso applies. Neumeier itself lends little guidance in this respect. In refusing to apply the
proviso, the court in Neumeier had merely noted that:
ignoring Ontario's policy requiring proof of gross negligence in a case which involves an Ontario-domiciled guest
at the expense of a New Yorker does not further the substantive law purposes of New York. In point of fact,
application of New York law would result in the exposure of this State's domiciliaries to a greater liability than
that imposed upon resident users of Ontario's highways. Conversely, the failure to apply Ontario's law would
"impair" . . . "the smooth working of the multistate system [and] produce great uncertainty for litigants" by
sanctioning forum shopping and thereby allowing a party to select a forum which could give him a larger recovery
than the court of his own domicile.
Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 458. The Schultz court, for its part, stated that Neumeier rule 3's purpose
was, in part, to discourage forum shopping. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d
679, 687 (N.Y. 1985) (application of New Jersey law would enhance the smooth working of the
multistate system by reducing the incentive for forum shopping). It also indicated that the proviso
would be used to protect party expectations, holding that application of New Jersey law in that case
would "provide certainty for the litigants whose only reasonable expectation surely would have been
that the law of [New Jersey] . . . would apply." Id.
Neumeier rule 3's proviso should be used sparingly so as to preserve the certainty that the rules
were meant to provide. Neumeier and Schultz teach that when displacing the law of the state where
the injury occurred would not frustrate that state's policy, then use of the proviso will discourage
forum shopping and protect party expectations. An expanded use, however, would allow courts to
substitute an ad hoc interest approach in situations where the first two Neumeier rules do not apply.
48. For a discussion of the European Contracts Choice of Law Convention and of Swiss law, see
Hay, supra note 1, at 359.
49. See id. at 364; supra notes 16, 29 (the English and Scottish Law Commissioners' proposal
for a (statutory) return to the lex loci subject to a proviso.)
50. 543 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1989).
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York statute, Labor Law section 240, provided for absolute liability of the owner
of property for injuries due to unsafe ladders or scaffolding.51
The court recognized, at the outset, that the statute has both conduct-regulating
and loss-allocating elements. The statute regulates conduct in that it "imposes a
duty on the owner (and contractor) to exercise oversight to ensure that scaffolding
and ladders used by workers are safe." 52 However, by placing the primary duty
on the owner, who has no control or supervision over the work, it makes the
owner vicariously liable for the negligence of the subcontractor or even the
worker himself.53 Vicarious liability, the court said, "merely represents a policy
determination to effect a deliberate allocation of risk."
5 4
Observing that "a particular statute may defy classification and render unavail-
ing the criteria governing choice of law suggested in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of
America," the court refrained the issue as a conflict between the law of the place
of tort (New Jersey) and the law of the place of contracting (New York) and
applied New York law.55 In so doing, the court appears to have followed Neumeier
rule 1, holding that "application of the law of the common domicile is favored
because of 'its interest in enforcing the decisions of both parties to accept both
the benefits and the burdens of identifying with that jurisdiction.' -56
In Salsman v. Barden, 7 also involving Labor Law section 240, another court
declined to apply the Neumeier rules because it classified the statute as a conduct-
regulating rule. The statute, the court pointed out, requires those persons subject
to it to follow specific safeguards or safety measures; failure to do so results in
absolute liability. Because no liability can be found absent a failure to follow the
safety requirements, the court concluded that the statute was "first and foremost"
a conduct-regulating rule.58 Recognizing that its characterization was contrary to
Calla v. Schulsky, the court explained that following Calla would mean the
application of New York law to a construction site outside New York when the
parties shared New York as their common domicile. 59 This fear, of course, was
51. Id. at 667. Liability under the statute was imposed even in the absence of an employer-
employee relationship and contributory negligence was not a factor. Id. New Jersey did not have a
similar statute.
52. Id. at 669.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court noted, however, that "the classification of statutes ... may be regarded as
somewhat artificial in that the act of shifting financial responsibility often serves to regulate conduct
by providing an inducement to exercise oversight ..... Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 670.
57. 564 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Div. 1990).
58. Id. at 548.
59. Id. at 549. Relying on reasoning similar to that in Salsman, a New York federal court also
characterized Labor Law § 240 as a conduct-regulating rule. See Zangiacomi v. Saunders, 714 F.
Supp. 658, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). There, a New York construction worker was injured when working
on a New York defendant's property in Connecticut. Connecticut law did not impose the same strict
liability principles as New York's Labor Law § 240. In the court's view, characterizing Labor Law
§ 240 as loss-allocating would lead to an unfair result because property owners who hire workmen
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unfounded. If Labor Law section 240 were characterized as loss-allocating, the
Neumeier rules would apply under Schultz. In a case involving two New York
parties injured out-of-state, as in Zangiacomi v. Saunders,60 New York's law, as
the law of the parties' common domicile, would apply under Neumeier rule 1,
a result arguably consistent with party expectations. In cases involving a New
York defendant and plaintiffs from other states, however, Neumeier rule 3 would
apply and, absent application of the proviso, would refer to the law of the place
of injury and not to the law of each plaintiff's domicile.
All this is to say that the Schultz distinction between rules of conduct regulation
and rules of loss allocation creates more trouble than it is worth. 6' The reasoning
(and even the results of cases applying the distinction) can generally be seen as
both confusing and inconsistent, thereby taking away from the certainty and
predictability that the Neumeier rules seek to provide.62 The distinction should be
abandoned in favor of the application of the Neumeier rules to all tort cases, no
matter what the nature of the rule. Those who favor the distinction consider the
from different states to perform work in one state would be subject to the laws of each worker's home
state. It therefore applied Connecticut law. See also Fiske v. Church of St. Mary of the Angels, 802
F. Supp. 872 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (characterizing Labor Law § 240 as conduct regulating and applying
New York law to New York construction accident involving Pennsylvania plaintiff).
60. See supra note 59.
61. For two other New York cases illustrating the difficult distinction between loss-allocating and
conduct-regulating rules, see Jones V. Munson Transp., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
A Wisconsin truck driver was killed in New York in an accident with an Illinois resident and the
truck driver's widow, also a Wisconsin domiciliary, sued. The Illinois resident, in turn, brought a
contribution action against the decedent's employer. At issue was the applicability of Wisconsin's
worker's compensation law that precluded the action for contribution. Id. at 880. The court character-
ized New York's rule allowing contribution against the employer as "conduct-regulating" since the
purpose of the rule is "to deter tortious activity by creating a deterrent." Id. at 882. It did not explain
the type of deterrent the rule created and whom it was designed to deter. The court also did not address
Wisconsin's rule that, because it precludes actions for contribution, could be seen as loss-allocating.
See also Arochem Int'l, Inc. v. Buirkle, 968 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1992) (federal court, applying New
York law, characterized a California "judicial-proceeding privilege" as conduct-regulating).
62. See, e.g., Stevens v. Shields, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 353; see also discussion supra notes 40, 46.
The court characterized a vicarious liability rule as loss-allocating. Stevens, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
One of the purposes of the rule, however, was to impose a "supervisory responsibility upon the parent
or guardian signing a minor's application for a driver's license" which would "cause parents...
to endorse only those minors whom they felt to be mature enough to accept and appreciate the
obligations of driving an automobile." Id. This goal seems to regulate conduct and not to allocate
loss. As a result the Florida rule appears to have a dual purpose, in that it both regulates conduct and
allocates loss. The Calla v. Schulsky court faced the same problem, but instead of recognizing the
dual purpose of the statute, it simply applied the law of the parties' common domicile.
Even in Schultz it was less than clear how charitable immunity should be characterized. The majority
considered the New Jersey statute as loss-allocating. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d
679, 685 (N.Y. 1985). The dissent pointed out, however, that New York's rule of noncharitable
immunity could very well be seen as conduct-regulating. Id. 699. The conflict between the majority
and dissent in Schultz will be a common one in cases where one state has a loss-allocating statute and
another state, by failing to adopt such a statute, has expressed its interest (or at least permits the
inference of an interest) in deterring conduct. See also Kozyris & Symeonides, supra note 40, at 616-
17 (discussing the difficulty that New York courts have with the distinction).
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difficulty in applying it a satisfactory price for "more rational solutions."-63
Equally fair (if not fairer) results, however, can be achieved by eliminating the
distinction and applying the Neumeier rules directly. 64
B. LOUISIANA: A NEW RULES STATE
With the recent codification of its conflicts law, Louisiana joined New York
as a state following specific rules rather than a generalized approach. 65 Although
phrased in terms of California's "comparative impairment" approach,66 the Loui-
siana Code's (Code) broad policy objectives remind of the Restatement (Second).
They focus on the contacts of the state to the parties and the events in light of
policies similar to those listed in section 6 of the Restatement (Second) .67 The
Code goes beyond the Restatement (Second), however, by setting forth a priori
63. See Symeonides, supra note 25, at 444.
64. For example: A plaintiff from state A sues a state B defendant in state B for an injury caused in
that state by the defendant's negligent act there. If state B law would not hold the defendant liable (or
were more favorable to the defendant) then Neuneier rule 2, first sentence, refers to the law of state B;
this is the same result that would be achieved by characterizing the law at issue as conduct-regulating.
If state A law were more favorable to the defendant, then rule 3 would again call for the application of
state B law, the same as characterizing the law as one of conduct regulation would do, absent application
of the proviso. If the defendant acted in state A causing injury there, and state A would hold the defendant
liable (or were less favorable to defendant than state B's law), then state A law would apply under
Neumeier rule 2; again, the court would reach the same result if it applied the law of the place of tort after
characterizing the rule as one of conduct regulation. Similarly, if state A's rule were more favorable to
defendant, then Neumeier rule 3 would again apply state A law absent application of the rule 3 proviso.
See Hay, supra note 1, at 390; see also Fiske, 802 F. Supp. at 882 (recognizing that same result would
be reached if Labor Law section 240 were characterized as loss-allocating). Jones, 685 F. Supp. at 882
(applying Neumeier rule 3 but recognizing that same result would be reached if the law at issue were
characterized as conduct-regulating); In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 567-68 (applying New York
law characterized as "conduct-regulating" to products liability action brought by New York plaintiffs
for injuries in New York caused by a drug manufactured outside the state, but recognizing that same
result would be reached if law were seen as loss-allocating).
Only some Neumeier rule 1 cases would be affected by abandoning the distinction between loss-
allocating and conduct-regulating rules. In cases involving parties who share a common domicile,
Neumeier rule 1 would always apply the law of the parties' domicile; however, a court that character-
ized a rule as conduct-regulating would almost always apply the law of the place of a tort. Arguably,
abandoning the distinction here produces a fairer result because the parties' expectations, to the extent
that they had any, are protected more by application of the law of their common domicile than by
application of the law of the place of tort even if the issue is the standard of conduct governing the
defendant's actions. While it is true that the locus jurisdiction has an interest in regulating conduct
within its borders, this interest is considerably less when the state regulates conduct by a nonresident
that affects only another nonresident. Therefore, in situations involving two parties with the same
domicile, the law of their common domicile should apply over the law of the place of tort regardless
of the rule involved. This suggestion is hardly novel. See supra note 46.
65. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3515-3549 (West Supp. 1992). For a thorough discussion of
the new Louisiana Code, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for
Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992).
66. For a brief discussion of the comparative impairment approach, see infra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
67. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3515 and revision comments. See also SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 2, at 599.
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legislative determinations, in the form of specific rules, of the general policy goals
listed in article 15.68 These rules, with respect to tort, as well as the reasoning
behind them, resemble the Neumeier rules as modified in Schultz.
The Code adopts the Schultz distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-
allocating rules providing for the application of the lex loci in cases involving
issues of conduct regulation when conduct and injury occur in the same state. 69
For cases involving loss-allocating rules, the Louisiana Code adopts Neumeier
rule 1.70 Also, as a result of the focus of article 44 on the parties' domiciles and
their expectation that they will be subject to their own laws, 7' the Code will
reach results consistent with Neumeier rule 2.72 Louisiana's Code also creates an
approach governing situations where conduct and injury occur in different states.73
As significant as the similarity of the new codification to the Neumeier rules
is its similarity to the reasoning displayed by Louisiana case law prior to the
Code's enactment. The general approach of article 15-which calls for the identifi-
cation of the various state policies implicated and an evaluation of the "strength
and pertinence" of those policies in light of "the relationship of each state to
the parties and the dispute" and "the policies and needs of the interstate and
international systems' " 74-parallels the approach, first taken in Jagers v. Royal
68. See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3542 (West Supp. 1992) (describing arts. 3543-3546
as the a priori rules governing "delictual and quasi-delictual obligations" (torts)).
69. See id. art. 3543. Louisiana's Code goes further than the Schultz court, however, in creating
a separate set of rules governing cases where conduct and injury occur in different states. See id. (law
of state of injury applies provided that injury was foreseeable in that state; but if Louisiana domiciliary
acted in Louisiana and Louisiana law provides for lower standard, then Louisiana law applies). See
also Symeonides, supra note 65, at 699-705.
70. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(1) (West Supp. 1992) and revision comments (art. 3544
chooses domicile as primary connecting factor for cases involving rules of loss allocation; "the applica-
tionof the law of the common domicile has become routine in all states that have abandoned the traditional
lex loci delicti rule"). For a recent case applying the Code consistent with Neumeier rule 1, see Levy
v. Jackson, 1993 WL 5561 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 1993) (applying Alabama guest statute to action
involving Alabama plaintiff and defendant overaccident in Louisiana). See also Symeonides, supra note
25, at 449-51 (Louisiana Code adopts the "common domicile rule" accepted in both American and
foreign jurisdictions). The Code also extends Neumeier rule 1, by including parties with different domi-
ciles when those states have the same standard for allocating loss. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3544(1).
See also Symeonides, supra note 65, at 723-25 (describing these so-called "fictitious common domi-
cile" cases). Under the Neumeier rules as they exist now, this result could be reached only by means of
the proviso to rule 3. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The New York courts generally have
not taken this route; yet it seems preferable to effectuate an identifiable policy objective through an
express rule than to leave its achievement to an escape device.
71. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3544 (West Supp. 1992) revision comments.
72. See id. art. 3544(2).
73. Id. art. 3544(2)(b) (applying the law of the state of injury if the injured person is domiciled
in that state, injury in that state was foreseeable, and that the state's law provided a higher standard
of financial protection for the injured person than the state of conduct; otherwise the court is to resort
to the general principles of art. 3542). While the Neumeier rules leave unresolved the case where
conduct and injury occur in different states, the portion of Neumeier rule 2, second sentence, providing
for its applicability absent "special circumstances" might indicate a different result under New York's
rules. See also Symeonides, supra note 65, at 725-31 (describing the new Code's application to
split-domicile cases).
74. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3515 (West Supp. 1992).
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Indemnity Co.75 and later followed by other Louisiana courts, 7 6 that combined
interest analysis and the Restatement (Second) approach. Several pre-Code Louisi-
ana decisions, for example, represent an implicit application of a common domi-
cile rule prior to its codification. 77 The court in Jagers had applied the law of the
parties' common domicile.78 Other cases similarly foreshadowed the new Code.
In Brown v. DSI Transports,79 a Louisiana court applied the lex fori, which,
however, was also the law common to the parties' different domiciles, to the
exclusion of the lex loci delicti because the state of injury was said to have a lesser
interest.' ° The court's rationale comports with the reasoning underlying article
44(l). 8' And in Lee v. Ford Motor Co.,82 the court reached a result consistent
with article 45(1), governing product liability cases: Louisiana law prohibits the
75. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
76. See, e.g., Brinkley & West, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1974). For
a survey of Louisiana cases following the approach set forth in Jagers and Brinkley, see James J.
Hautot, Comment, Choice of Law in Louisiana: Torts, 47 LA. L. REv. 1109 (1987); see also Smith,
supra note 40, at 1078-80.
77. See, e.g., Hanzo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 So. 2d 928 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Louisiana
law applied where two Louisiana plaintiffs were injured in Hawaii when a car driven by a Louisiana
defendant left the road and crashed into an embankment); Richard v. Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co., 442 So.
2d 875 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (applying law of parties' common domicile); Powell v. Warner, 398 So.
2d 22 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (Mississippi law to a case involving Mississippi parties).
78. See Jagers, 276 So. 2d at 313; see also Symeonides, supra note 25, at 451 n.74 (recognizing
similarity between Jagers and the facts of New York's Babcock v. Jackson, which led to New York's
adoption of the common domicile rule in Neumeier); Symeonides, supra note 65, at 701 (indicating that
Jagers may have also implicitly adopted the distinction between loss-allocating and conduct-regulating
rules).
79. 496 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d 18 (La. 1986).
80. Id. The court pointed out that because the plaintiff was domiciled in Louisiana, the economic
impact of a decision to apply Alabama's contributory negligence rule would be felt in Louisiana. Id.
at 482. The court also noted that its decision would be different if the conflicting laws concerned
standards of negligence. Id. at 483 n.5. This possibly suggests that Louisiana's pre-Code approach
adopted the distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-allocating rules.
81. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3544(1) (West Supp. 1992). This result is also consonant with the
application of a modified Neumeier rule 1. See Hay, supra note 1, at 387. For other cases with results
consistent with the new Louisiana Code and the Neumeier rules, see Willett v. National Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 966 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 355 (La. 1992) (Louisianalaw resulting
in increased recovery for New Hampshire plaintiffs applied to case involving Louisiana accident and
Louisiana defendant; result consistent with art. 3544(2)(a) and Neumeier rule 3); Piper v. Alamo Rent-
A-Car, Inc., 567 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (Louisiana law applied where Louisiana plaintiff
injured in Louisiana by car rented from Florida rental company and driven by Washington defendant;
for vicarious liability issue, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3542, as "guided" by art. 3544(2)(a) would
provide same result); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 718 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. La. 1989) (Louisiana law applied
in case involving Louisiana plaintiff, California defendant and injury in Louisiana consistent with art.
3544(2)(a) and Neumeier rule 2, second sentence); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 789
F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986) (Louisiana law providing greater recovery than Uruguayan law applied be-
tween Uruguayan plaintiffs and non-Louisiana defendant involving Louisiana air crash litigation; result
same under art. 3544(b)(1)); Karavokiros v. Indiana Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. La. 1981)
(applying Louisiana law prohibiting punitive damages; consistent with art. 3546); Burns v. Holiday
Travels, Inc., 459 So. 2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (Florida law applied in an action by Louisiana plain-
tiffs against a Florida defendant to recover for emotional distress suffered while on vacation in Florida;
result consistent with art. 3544(2)(a) and Neumeier rule 2, first sentence). For a discussion of earlier
pre-Code Louisiana decisions, see also Hautot, supra note 76, at 1109-52.
82. 457 So. 2d 193 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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recovery of punitive damages applied in an action arising from the death of a
Louisiana resident killed as a result of an alleged defect in an automobile purchased
from a Louisiana dealer and manufactured in Georgia. 3
These pre-Code decisions suggest, however tentatively, that Louisiana may
have simply codified a priori value judgments that existed implicitly in Louisiana
case law. Four of the pre-Code Louisiana cases appear to have adopted a common
domicile rule." Brown, moreover, followed Louisiana's "fictitious common do-
micile" rule and applied the law common to both parties' different domiciles.8 5
States following other approaches have yet to convert decisional law into statu-
tory choice-of-law rules. The following sections, however, illustrate that several
"approach" states may also have created Neumeier-like decisional patterns that
display certain predetermined value choices.
M. Approach-Oriented States
The Neumeier rules were born of a synthesis of case law that sought an alterna-
tive to the classic lex loci rule in tort conflicts law. The pre-Neumeier case law
had adopted an approach to the choice-of-law problem, namely, to determine the
center of gravity or some similar focal element of the particular case. As noted
earlier, such an approach may leave the resolution of concrete cases very much
in the eye of the beholder; Neumeier returned to rules precisely to guard against
that kind of uncertainty. ,86 The difference between the rules of traditional con-
flicts law and those of the Neumeier decision is that the latter proceed on the basis
of predetermined interests and values: they do not envision ad hoc determinations,
they are "principled rules.' 8 "
"Interest analysis," in the form proposed by Currie (and not pursued further
in this survey),88 does not weigh interests, either in an a priori fashion or case by
case. In the main, it applies the lex fori whenever the case presents a "true
conflict." 89 A variation of interest analysis, Currie-style, developed and took hold
in California: the "comparative impairment" approach does undertake to weigh
83. See also Ramsey v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. La. 1989)
(Louisiana law prohibiting punitive damages applied in case between Louisiana plaintiff and Texas
defendant involving allegedly defective helicopter; result consistent with art. 3545(1) and Neumeier
rule 3); Pittman v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. 559 So. 2d 879 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied,
563 So. 2d 885 (La. 1990) (Louisiana law prohibiting punitive damages applied in product liability
suit brought by Louisiana plaintiff against California defendant; same result under art. 3545(1) and
Neumeier rule 3).
84. Hanzo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 So. 2d 928 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Richard v. Beacon
Nat'l Ins. Co., 442 So. 2d 875 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Powell v. Warner, 398 So. 2d 22 (La. Ct. App.
1981); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
85. See Brown v. DSI Transp., Inc., 496 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 498 So. 2d
18 (La. 1986); discussion supra notes 79-81.
86. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
87. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 2.17, at 43-44.
88. For a discussion of Currie's approach, see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 2.6.
89. Id. § 2.6.
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"interests," as does the Restatement (Second) when it calls for the application
of the law of the place of "the most significant relationship" to the issues and
to the parties. 9° Both approaches are relatively open-ended, 91 and therefore raise
the question whether subsequent judicial practice displays any kind of a pattern
with predictive value. The sections that follow explore this question and take the
Neumeier rules as the benchmark.
A. CALIFORNIA: THE COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT APPROACH
One variant of interest analysis undertakes to compare and weigh the competing
policy interests of the states involved. The approach adopted several years ago
by California2 seeks to determine the state whose policies would be more impaired
than those of another state by not having its law applied. The state that would be
disadvantaged in this way, and whose law therefore should be applied, may well
be a state other than the forum.93 California's application of its comparative
impairment approach reveals only slight, and perhaps somewhat sporadic, deci-
sional patterns that parallel the Neumeier rules.
In Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court, 94 for example, a California appeals court
did not apply the common domicile rule to a bad faith insurance claim brought
by an insured Pennsylvanian against a Pennsylvania insurance company.95 Other
California decisions, however, applied the comparative impairment approach in
a manner consistent with both the reasoning and results of Neumeier rule 2. In
Denham v. Farmers Ins. Co. 96 the court applied Nevada law, consistent with
90. For torts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
91. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 2, § 2.15, at 37 n.1.
92. Id. § 2.6, at n.21.
93. See Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (an early example).
94. 188 Cal. App. 3d 28, 224 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Ct. App. 1986), dismissed as moot, 736 P.2d 319
(Cal. 1987).
95. In Nicolet, asbestos manufacturers had brought suit against their insurance companies claim-
ing bad faith denial of coverage when the insurance companies changed coverage requirements in
order to lessen their exposure to asbestos claims. Several of those asbestos claims were pending
against the insureds in California. Punitive damages were available under California law but not in
Pennsylvania. 224 Cal. Rptr. at 416. Ignoring the parties' contacts with Pennsylvania (and, perhaps,
the parties' expectations that Pennsylvania law would apply) the court focused on the fact that several
of the claims against the insured, for which it was seeking coverage, were pending in California
courts. Id. at 417-18. It held that application of Pennsylvania's law prohibiting punitive damages
would assist Pennsylvania "in sheltering against the world a corporation whose blatant misconduct,
if proved, might wreak immense damage outside the confines of its home state." Id. at 418. This,
the court concluded, would create "an archaic result in the context of the modern realities of [the
insurance company's] role as a multi-state corporation." Id.
Another California decision, Rivera v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 217 Cal. App. 3d 294, 266 Cal.
Rptr. 11 (Ct. App. 1990), presented the opportunity to apply a modified Neumeier rule 1 (that of
applying the law common to the parties' different domiciles) to a case where a California plaintiff
was injured while attempting to "hop" a Los Angeles-bound train in Arizona. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text. Instead of focusing on the law of the train owners' domicile, the court considered
only Arizona and California law, finding a false conflict. 266 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
96. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1061, 262 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1989).
SUMMER 1993
388 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Neumeier rule 2, first sentence, to a bad faith insurance case that arose out of a
Nevada accident between California plaintiffs and a Nevada driver insured by the
defendant insurance company. 97 A similar conclusion was reached in Zimmerman
v. Allstate Ins. Co. as well as in other cases.9 s Neumeier rule 3 is also represented
in several California decisions. 99
97. Nevada law did not allow for third-party bad faith claims but, at the time of the accident,
California law did. 262 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48. Nevada's interest in protecting its insurers (and, through
it, its insureds) against third-party bad faith claims would, in the court's view, be most seriously
impaired if not applied. Id. at 149.
98. 179 Cal. App. 3d 840, 224 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1986) (Oklahoma law prohibiting
third-party bad faith insurance claims applied when Illinois resident was injured in Oklahoma by
Oklahoma resident; Oklahoma law protecting Oklahoma insurers from third-party bad faith claims,
and their insureds who would be forced to pay for claims through higher premiums, would be more
impaired if not applied). While the courts did not discuss the insurers' state of incorporation or
principal place of business in either case, they appear to have treated the insurance companies as
"domiciliaries" of the state in which the insured resided and where the insurance policy was issued,
perhaps in recognition of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988) which, for jurisdictional purposes, treats
an insurance company as a resident of the state in which the insured resides in all direct action cases
the insured is not joined as a party. For a discussion of the difficulty of the concept of "corporate
domicile," see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 2, § 4.46, at 213-14.
Other cases applying comparative impairment in a manner consistent with the Neumeier rules
include Engel v. CBS Inc., 981 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1992) (New York law, which would be less
favorable to plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution applied to claims involving California plaintiff
and New York defendant over malicious prosecution occurring in New York; result consistent with
Neumeier rule 2, first sentence); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983)
(California's one-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the two-year statutes in Texas and Alaska,
applied to a claim by a Texas plaintiff against a California defendant for injuries sustained in Alaska
caused by negligent conduct in California; result consistent with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence);
North Am. Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App.
1986) (California law placing no time limit on actions against dissolved corporations applied in a case
involving California domiciliaries with outstanding tort claims that arose in California against a
dissolved Illinois corporation; Illinois law placed two-year time limit on such actions; result consistent
with Neumeier rule 2, second sentence). See also Smith, supra note 40, at 1055-58 (survey of
California decisions); Kozyris, supra note 40, at 556-57 (discussing various California choice-of-law
decisions).
99. See, e.g., Paulo v. Bepex Corp., 792 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ontario law applied to products
liability claim brought by injured Ontario domiciliary against California machinery manufacturer who
installed the allegedly defective machine at the Ontario employer's plant in Ontario; court reasoned
that the defendant's expectations would be that Ontario law applied and that it would not be unfair
to subject the plaintiff, who invoked the protection of Ontario workers' compensation law, to the
burdens of that law). Other cases applying the comparative impairment approach consistent with
Neumeier rule 3 include: Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Arizona law applied to action by California plaintiffs injured in Arizona by a truck driven by Arkansas
driver and owned by Oklahoma employer); In re Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986)
(California law, which was less favorable to plaintiffs, applied to defamation claim brought by
California plaintiffs against New York defendants for injury to reputation suffered in California);
Fleury v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 698 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1983) (California's shorter
statute of limitations applied to defamation claim brought by California plaintiffs against New York
defendants for damage to reputation felt in California); Gallagher v. Koppers Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d
713, 191 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1983) (Oregon law applied to product liability claim against
Pennsylvania paint manufacturer by decedents of an Oregon domiciliary, who later moved to Califor-
nia, for fatal injuries received while using the product in Oregon). But see Hill v. Hill, 193 Cal. App.
3d 1118, 238 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1987) (California law, which did not provide for interspousal
immunity, applied to negligence suit brought by British Columbia plaintiff against his spouse who
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This brief survey of California's experience with the comparative impairment
approach suggests, perhaps, an implicit adoption of predetermined values similar
to those underlying New York's Neumeier rules. Of the cases surveyed, only
three would have come out differently under the Neumeier rules. '0 No cases
explicitly applied principled rules, but several decisions did reach results consis-
tent with the Neumeier rules, engaging in Neumeier-like reasoning.'01
Nicolet (the only California case surveyed that involved parties from the same
state), however, failed to adopt the common domicile rule-the rule most accepted
both by rules states as well as other approach states.'°2 Hill v. Hill, furthermore,
failed to apply the law of the place of injury in a Neumeier rule 3 situation, using
instead the law most favorable to the plaintiff.'0 3 These decisions disagree with
the Neumeier rules perhaps not so much because the comparative impairment
approach and the Neumeier rules are basically incompatible, but because the
California approach may not have been properly applied. Nicolet favored Califor-
nia law because the application of Pennsylvania law would have produced an
"archaic result in the context of ... modern realities." '4 Hill v. Hill also adopts
a "better law" orientation at the expense of predictable, albeit implicit a priori
value choices.' 05 California decisions that direct their focus on party expectations,
on the other hand, have displayed a pattern more similar to New York decisions
applying the Neumeier rules.'°6
B. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) S'rATES
For some areas, for example, those related to property, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) retains the traditional rules. For many others, including tort and contract,
lived in California for accident occurring in British Columbia because British Columbia had since
dropped its interspousal immunity law; under Neumeier rule 3, British Columbia law would have
applied); Marsh v. Burrell, 850 F. Supp. 1493 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (California law which, unlike the
law of the Netherlands, did not limit plaintiff's damages, held to apply to assault, battery, and negligent
hiring claims brought against California defendants by plaintiffs hiring in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom for a tort that occurred in the Netherlands; under Neumeier rule 3, the law of the
Netherlands would apply).
100. See Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 28, 244 Cal. Rptr. 408 (Ct. App.
1986), dismissed as moot, 736 P.2d 319 (Cal. 1987) (discussed supra notes 94-95); Hill, 238 Cal.
Rptr. at 745.
101. Denham v. Farmers Ins. Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1067, 262 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Ct. App. 1989)
(discussed supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text); Zimmerman, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 917; Paulo,
792 F.2d at 894.
102. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (Louisiana); infra notes 111-13 (Illinois), 114
(Colorado), 116 (Florida & Texas).
103. See Hill, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (discussed supra note 99).
104. Nicolet, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (discussed supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text).
105. See Hill, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (discussed supra note 99). See also SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 2, § 17.17, at 598-99 (discussing Offshore Rental Co., another California decision with reasoning
suggestive of the better law approach); Hay, supra note 1, at 355-56 (discussing intersection of the
comparative impairment and better law approaches).
106. See Denham, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (discussed supra notes 96-97); Zimmerman, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 917 (discussed supra note 98); Paulo, 792 F.2d at 894 (discussed supra note 99).
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it introduces an approach for the determination of the applicable law.' 07 The court
should identify "the place of the most significant relationship" to the issue and the
parties and then apply its law. For torts, section 145 lists a number of nonexclusive
factors (for example, place of the tort, domicile of the parties, and so forth) that
should be considered in making the decision and refers to the pervasive general
principles of section 6, on the basis of which these factors should be evaluated.
The general principles are broadly phrased0 s and can accommodate virtually
all points of view.'09 Moreover, neither they nor the specific connecting factors
assign priorities: They are co-equal. In addition, they are designed to apply to
particular issues and not necessarily to the whole case. The first aspect-co-equal
factors and considerations-means that no a priori judgments have been made;
the courts are encouraged to weigh these considerations on a case-by-case basis.
The second aspect, issue splitting (dipecage), could mean that law-fact patterns
will multiply rather than be reduced to a few basic archetypal situations, such as
in the Neumeier rules. The case law must thus develop decisional patterns that
reduce the risk that, while opinions pay lip service to systemic values and policies,
the decisional process in fact is so flexible as to be ad hoc and, thus, unprinci-
pled. "0 Case law in several Restatement (Second) states appears, to some extent,
to adhere to discernible decisional patterns.
Illinois, in Estate of Barnes,"' explicitly adopted the common domicile rule
embodied in Neumeier rule 1 and other Illinois courts have followed. 12 However,
107. Professor Reese, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second), thought that "[T]he American
Law Institute is clearly in favour of rules." Willis Reese, The Present State of Choice of Law in the
United States, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 361, 366 (Maarten Bos ed., 1973).
At the same time, he acknowledged that the Restatement (Second) gives the courts "no guidance other
than that they should consider a number of factors in arriving at their decisions .... The uncertainty
or ambiguity of Babcock (see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text) is reflected in the Restatement.
.. Id. at 364-65.
108. E.g., the relevant policies of the forum and other interested states, the needs of the interstate
and international legal systems, the objectives of uniformity, certainty, and predictability, and the
ease of determining and applying a law so identified. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6 (1973).
109. Hay, supra note 1, at 373-74.
110. See id. at 392-400.
111. 478 N.E.2d 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). This case arose out of a dispute over the distribution
of proceeds obtained through settlement of a wrongful death claim, originally brought in Michigan
under a Michigan wrongful death statute by the widow of an employee killed on the job in Michigan.
Id. at 1048. Ordinarily, the court held, "[tlhe simple fact of domicile will be indicative of the
jurisdiction's superior interest in having its laws applied in order to give effect to [its] tort policies"
because "a jurisdiction will normally formulate tort policies with reference to the competing interests
of compensating its domiciliaries for injury and of limiting tort recoveries against its domiciliaries."
Id. at 1051. The court applied Michigan law, however, because the original wrongful death claim
was filed, and ultimately settled, under Michigan's wrongful death statute. The court was unwilling
to have one state's law govern liability and another state's law govern distribution because the amount
of recovery allowed under the Michigan statute took into account the method by which it would be
distributed.
112, See, e.g., Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (111. 1988) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1971)) (Canadian law, which, unlike Illinois', did not provide for
interspousal immunity, applied when a Canadian couple was injured in Illinois; court held that "[t]he
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one Illinois court declined to apply the common domiciliary law when it analyzed
the case on the basis of the distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-
allocating rules."
3
Colorado has embraced Neumeier rule l's common domicile rule (as well as
Neumeier rule 2),'4 although few, if any, Colorado courts subsequently followed
the specific rules." 5 Florida and Texas, while not adopting it specifically, also
appear to follow a common domicile rule.1' 6 Indeed, of the sixteen Restatement
applicable law will usually be the local law of the state of the parties' domicile"); Pinorsky v.
Pinorsky, 576 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Florida law applied to action involving two Florida
domiciliaries); Edwardsville Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Marion Lab. Inc., 808 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1987) (recognizing the rule in Barnes; the case, however, presented a Neumeier rule 2 situation). In
addition, some Illinois cases reached results consistent with the common domicile rule without dis-
cussing the significance of the parties' domicile. See Harkcom v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., 433 N.E.2d 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (Illinois law applied to Iowa accident involving Illinois
parties); Schrier v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 402 N.E.2d 872 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (Indiana law
applied to Indiana accident between two Indiana residents when only Illinois contacts were that it was
the forum state, defendant's railroad lines ran into Illinois, and defendant had an office in Illinois).
113. See Rosett v. Schatzman, 510 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (Florida law applied in a case
between two Illinois residents arising out of an accident in Florida). In that case, the court held that
Florida law applied because, for issues involving standards of conduct, the place of injury and the
place of tort are the most significant contacts; they were in Florida. Id. at 970-71. It was the parties'
common domicile, in the court's view, that was the "fortuitous" contact. Id. at 971. The Restatement
(Second) supports this result. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. e (1971).
A focus on party expectations, however, may also support a contrary result, as would Neumeier rule
1 before its modification in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). See
supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. For another Illinois case recognizing the distinction
between loss-allocating rules and those that regulate conduct, see Schulze v. Illinois Highway Transp.
Co., 423 N.E.2d 278 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981) (characterizing law at issue as one of loss allocation and
applying the common domicile rule to a case between Illinois domiciliaries arising out of a Michigan
accident).
114. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973) (Colorado couple killed in a plane
crash in South Dakota; the guardian of the wife's children brought a wrongful death action against
the husband's estate). Rostek, as had Neumeier, involved the applicability of a state's guest statute.
The court voiced concern over the ad hoc nature of modem approaches and, therefore, adopted
Neumeier rules 1 and 2 to add an element of predictability to the Restatement (Second) approach (the
court envisioned the Restatement (Second) as a starting point for the development of more specific
rules). Id. at 320. Because the parties shared a common domicile, the court applied Colorado law
under the first rule. The decision was the subject of much comment. See Ved P. Nanda, A Positive
but Uncertain Step Forward for Choice of Law Problems in Colorado: The Rostek Decision, 51 DENV.
L.J. 557 (1974); Maryann Walsh, Heads: Lex Loci Delicti; Tails: Lex Loci Domicile-The Conflict
of Laws Coin on Edge, 51 DENV. L.J. 567 (1974); Case Note, "Rules" v. "Approaches": Choosing
a Choice-of-Law Principle for Colorado, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 107 (1974); see also SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 2, § 17.25, at 611.
115. See infra note 117.
116. Florida: See, e.g., Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Florida
law applied in a wrongful death action involving a Florida plaintiff and a Florida defendant). The
court placed substantial significance on section 178, comment b of the Restatement (Second): "In a
situation where one state is the state of domicile of the defendant, the decedent and the beneficiaries,
it would seem that, ordinarily at least, the wrongful death statute of this state should be applied to
determine the measure of damages." Id. at 614 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 175 cmt. b (1971). See also Pennington v. Dye, 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(Ohio law applied in negligence action by an Ohio resident who was injured by Ohio defendant);
Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (Florida law applied
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(Second) decisions involving common domicile fact patterns surveyed, only one
failed to apply the law of the parties' common domicile.
Decisions in several Restatement (Second) states reveal patterns that may also
suggest implicit value choices similar to those underlying Neumeier rules 2 and
3.117 Illinois decisions, for instance, have used "Neumeier-like" reasoning in
cases involving Neumeier rule 2 fact patterns," 8 but many Illinois decisions may
not expressly address the policy decisions underlying Neumeier rule 2, instead
when Florida plaintiff sued Florida rental car company under theory of vicarious liability for injuries
received in Louisiana); Andrews v. Continental Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(in dispute between injured Maine insurance policy holder and Maine insurance company, Maine law
governed whether Florida's collateral source rule, which would decrease uninsured motorist recovery
for benefits received for other sources, applied); Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (Florida law applied in action by Florida guest against Florida host-driver; court
refused to apply Georgia guest statute because it was "mere happenstance" that accident occurred
in Georgia); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Florida
law applied in wrongful death action by parents of Florida college students who died when plane
rented from Florida defendants crashed in North Carolina; court reached this result by calling the
Florida college students Florida domiciliaries even though their parents lived in Massachusetts and
New York).
Texas: Robertson v. Mcknight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980) (New Mexico law applied favoring
plaintiff in a wrongful death claim involving New Mexico couple killed in Texas plane crash); Osborn
v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied) (Alabama law applied in
action by one Alabama employee against another for accident in Texas); Total Oilfield Servs., Inc.
v. Garcia, 711 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. 1986) (Texas law applied in wrongful death claim against Texas
corporation by estate of Texas worker killed on the job in Oklahoma); see also Smith, supra note
40, at 1147 (discussing Robertson and Garcia as well as other Texas cases).
117. As noted above, one Colorado court has expressly adopted Neumeier rule 2, although later
Colorado decisions have ignored the Rostek decision, perhaps out of an implicit determination that
the rules adopted in Rostek apply only to guest statute cases. Some of these later Colorado cases,
which focus more on a "contact counting" approach to the Restatement (Second), reach results
inconsistent with Neumeier rule 2. See, e.g., Lewis-DeBoer v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 728 F. Supp.
642 (D. Colo. 1990) (Texas law favoring plaintiff applied to products liability claim by Colorado
plaintiff against Texas aircraft manufacturer for Colorado plane crash; result inconsistent with
Neumeier rule 2, first sentence); Dorr v. Briggs, 709 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Colo. 1989); Kozoway v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 641 (D. Colo. 1989) (Iowa law favoring plaintiff applied in
product liability action against Iowa defendant for injury suffered by Canadian resident in Canada;
result inconsistent with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence); Kinnett v. Sky's West Parachute Ctr., Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 1039 (D. Colo. 1984) (Wyoming law, again favoring plaintiff, applied in action by
Wyoming domiciliaries against Colorado defendant for claims arising from midair collision in Colo-
rado; result inconsistent with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence). See also Kozyris & Symeonides, supra
note 40, at 612 (discussing Lewis-DeBoer and Dorr in a survey of choice-of-law decisions in 1989);
Smith, supra note 40, at 1058-59 (discussing pre-1980 choice-of-law decisions in Colorado state
courts and Colorado district court decisions that applied a straight Restatement (Second) approach
without resort to specific rules).
118. See, e.g., Edwardsville Nat'l Bank v. Marion Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1987)(Indiana law applied to a claim of medical malpractice that allegedly occurred in Indiana between
Indiana doctors and an Indiana medical center and an Illinois plaintiff). Of interest is the fact that a
majority of the Restatement (Second) decisions surveyed that confronted Neumeier rule 2 fact situations
yielded results consistent with the rules. It is also noteworthy that the cases inconsistent with rule 2
did not focus on party expectations, as the Neumeier court arguably did, see supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text, but instead on contact counting or some other ad hoc approach to the Restatement
(Second).
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applying the Restatement (Second) in a contact counting manner. "9 Florida and
Texas decisions have also applied the Restatment (Second) with results consistent
with Neumeier rules 2 and 3. However, again, few cases apply a predetermined
set of policy choices similar to those underlying Neumeier rules 2 and 3, instead
focusing on contact counting. 1
20
119. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Kasbohm, 475 N.E.2d 984 (il. App. Ct. 1985) (Michigan recreational
use statute applied in an action by Illinois plaintiff against Michigan defendant for injuries suffered
in Michigan; court's reasoning focused on contact counting instead of reasoning similar to Neumeier
rule 2). For other Illinois decisions that reached results consistent with Neumeier rule 2 while applying
the Restatement (Second) in a contact-counting manner, see Mech v. Pullman Standard Corp., 484
N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (Indiana law applied to contribution claim by the general contractor
of Indiana construction site against its Illinois subcontractor, whose injured employee had sued the
general contractor); Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1987) (consistent
with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence, Indiana law applied to portion of case involving Indiana defendant
for injuries suffered in Indiana accident).
Illinois decisions consistent with Neumeier rule 3 also engaged primarily in a contact-counting
approach to the Restatement (Second). See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 439 N.E.2d
526 (il. App. Ct. 1982) (New York law applied to a New Yorker's claim of misappropriation, which
occurred in New York, against an Illinois defendant); French v. Beatrice Foods Co., 854 F.2d 964
(7th Cir. 1988) (Alabama law applied to retaliatory discharge claim by Alabama resident against
Illinois defendant); Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981) (Georgia
law applied to action by Illinois plaintiff against Georgia defendant for a defect in aircraft apparently
created in Georgia but discovered in Wisconsin). But see Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741 F. Supp.
698 (N.D. 11. 1990) (Restatement (Second) approach treated like interest analysis; result consistent
with Neumeier rule 3). For a discussion of the Nelson case, along with another Illinois decision
applying the Restatement (Second) as interest analysis, In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 734
F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. IIl. 1990), see Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990:
Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 488-89 (1991).
120. Florida: See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Oslen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981)
(Illinois law applied to action against an insurance company (domicile unknown) for a claim arising
from Illinois accident between a Florida plaintiff and Illinois uninsured motorist; court focused mainly
on fact that Illinois was place of injury); AIU Ins. Co. v. Reese, 498 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (Alabama law applied to action by Florida plaintiff against Alabama defendant for injuries
received in an Alabama automobile accident; court characterized the rule as regulating conduct but
result consistent with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence); Adams v. Brannan, 500 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (North Carolina law allowing punitive damages applied to action by Illinois plaintiffs
against North Carolina insurance company arising out of Florida accident with an uninsured motorist;
plaintiff-favoring result was inconsistent with Neumeier rule 3); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys., 567 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Georgia law, which did not provide
for vicarious liability, applied to contribution action brought by Arkansas company against a Florida
rental car company under theory of vicarious liability after renter was involved in a Georgia accident
with plaintiffs truck; result inconsistent with Neumeier rule 3).
Texas: See, e.g., Perry v. Aggregate Plant Prods. Co., 786 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1990, writ denied) (Texas law applied in product liability action by Indiana resident injured while in
Texas by product manufactured by a Texas company); Trailways Inc. v. Clark, 794 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (result consistent with Neumeier rule 3). Cf. Crisman v.
Cooper Indus., 748 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (applied Florida law to
product liability suit brought by Tennessee resident against a Texas corporation that designed allegedly
defective product in Illinois and sold it in Florida; focusing on party expectations, court held Texas
manufacturer would expect to defend a product liability suit in Florida for injuries caused there by
a product manufactured outside Texas and sold in Florida). One Texas decision inconsistent with a
Neumeier-like approach applied the Restatement (Second) in a plaintiff-favoring manner: See Wall
v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Texas law applied to
medical malpractice action by Texas plaintiff against Louisiana doctor for injuries suffered as a result
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IV. Conclusions: Bridging the Gap Between Rules and Approaches
If one only looks at numbers, this brief survey reveals a striking similarity
between the results reached in particular cases by states applying free-wheeling
approaches and the results that would be reached under the Neumeier rules. Of
the cases surveyed few (approximately twelve) would have come out differently
under the Neumeier rules; and four of those decisions were New York cases
failing to apply Neumeier.
However, numbers are only part of the story. The reasoning supporting the
decisions reveals the Neumeier-like flexibility and predictability that principled
analysis can achieve. Most approach states, for example, have followed the
common-domicile rule articulated in Neumeier rule 1 and adopted in several
countries abroad.' 2 ' Louisiana has codified the common-domicile rule,' and
Illinois and Colorado have explicitly recognized the application of the law of the
parties' common domicile through decisional law. 123 In addition, the decisional
law of Florida and Texas has almost invariably applied an unarticulated common-
domicile rule for reasons similar to those underlying Neumeier rule 1. Decisions
refusing to apply common domiciliary law have done so by giving preference to
a "better law" approach that has produced a plaintiff-favoring result. 124
The most notable common element in approach state decisions that reach results
consistent with the Neumeier rules is their focus on party expectations. This should
not surprise. The Neumeier rules focus on party expectations: Neumeier rule 1
focuses on the expectations of both parties; rules 2 and 3 focus on the expectation
of one party and the concomitant conclusion that it would not be unfair to subject
the other party to the law expected by the first. By focusing on the same value
goals (for example, party expectations) in recurrent fact patterns, approach states
can achieve a level of predictability similar to that ofjurisdictions with articulated
principled rules and, at the same time, retain some of the flexibility that choice-of-
law approaches were meant to provide.
The perception of a gap, of something irreconcilable, between legal systems
of surgery performed in Louisiana; result inconsistent with Neumeier rule 2, first sentence). Federal
courts applying Texas choice-of-law principles have also reached results consistent with Neumeier
rule 3, but have done so mainly as a result of contact counting. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1147-
48 n.614 (listing cases). Once again, it is interesting to note that, as with the Neumeier rule 2 cases,
a majority of the cases surveyed with Neumeier rule 3 fact patterns would have come out the same
under Neumeier rule 3.
121. See Hay, supra note 1, at 366-69.
122. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (Illinois); supra note 114 and accompanying
text (Colorado).
124. See Rosett v. Schatzman, 510 N.E.2d 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (discussed supra note 113 and
accompanying text) (Illinois decision refusing to apply law of parties' common domicile with result
favoring recovery by plaintiff); Nicolet, Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 28, 244 Cal. Rptr.
408 (Ct. App. 1986), dismissed as moot, 736 P.2d 319 (Cal. 1987) (discussed supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text) (California decisions favoring plaintiff and declining to apply common domicile
rule).
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with rules and those following approaches for the determination of the applicable
law is itself dated. Its articulated 5 or intuitive basis is, on the one hand, that rules
are rigid, (therefore bad on principle or, at best, of limited utility in a world of
differentiated fact patterns and various constellations of interests) and, on the
other hand, that approaches will result in, and indeed invite, ad hoc decision
making, "Khadi-justice. ,126 Both views misstate today's situation, if indeed they
were ever entirely correct. "Rules" may of course be rigid. But this is so because
they are drawn too sweepingly, not because they are value-neutral. All rules, as do
even ad hoc decisions, express value judgments. The lesson of the new European
codifications (principally the Rome Convention on choice of law in contract) is
that rules can be fashioned more narrowly with more regard to the variety of
interests to be addressed. The Louisiana codification, with its roots in the compara-
tive impairment approach, goes in the same direction, as do New York's Neumeier
rules for tort choice of law."2 7
Similarly, approaches may lead to free-wheeling, ad hoc decision making.
Undeniably, they have done so in a large number of cases since U.S. conflicts
law began to undergo its revolution. The U.S. approaches gave courts little or
no guidance, and the course of decision making became unpredictable. 121
As rule formulation can become more differentiated, decision making on the
basis of approaches can become more principled. A priori identification of values
and interests, basic to rule-based systems, whether statutory or decisional, is not
part of most U.S. choice-of-law methodologies. Decisional patterns may emerge,
however, simply because there is agreement on certain basic propositions. These
decisional patterns then can furnish insights and have predictive value. Discerning
decisional patterns is not as easy as when value goals are predetermined by rule.
But approach-based systems have a degree of certainty, just as rule-based systems
have a measure of flexibility. 2 9
125. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law, 30 AM. J. COMP.
L. 117, 127 (1982) ("[clertainty requires rigid rules, and flexibility is the antithesis of rigidity").
126. Paul H. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 795, 802 (1963). See also Laycock, supra note 26.
127. Incidentally, it should not make much difference whether rules are statute-based, as in civilian
systems, or are established by decisional law, common-law style. Since all rules, the European rules
as well as Neumeier rule 3, will have a final proviso for the displacement of the rule in exceptional
cases, the ultimate question, and danger, in both the civilian and common law systems will always
be whether decisional practice in administering the exception will, in the end, swallow up the rule.
See supra notes 16, 29. See also supra notes 46-47, 70.
128. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 2, § 2.17.
129. At the margin, then, the question always reduces to when is it appropriate to depart from the
rule or decisional pattern? This question, with which the American conflicts revolution began, now
gains increasing importance in Europe as rules are intended to be more interest-specific. See Werner
F. Ebke, Erste Erfahrungen mit dem EG-Schuldvertragsabereinkommen, in EUROPKISCHEs GEMEIN-
SCHAFrsRECHT UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 77, 104 (v. Bar ed., 1990); see also id. at 100-
02; Taupitz, Kaffeefahrten deutscher Urlauber auf Gran Canaria: Deutscher Verbraucherschutz im
Urlausgepack, 1990 BETRIEBS-BERATER 642.
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